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On July 16, the Convention approved a version of Sherman’s compromise, whereby the lower house would base representation on the population of the states, and the higher house would have equal representation for all states. It was viewed as a tremendous victory for the smaller states, who “felt safe, no longer threatened by those towering bullies” (186). Yet suspicions remained that the advocates for the Constitution really wanted a king, rendering the balance of power between large and small states moot. Some delegates did suggest that something like a king would be necessary to put a check on excessive democracy. Within the Convention, this debate took shape over the method of electing the president, with some calling for a direct popular vote and others for an election by Congress. They also debated the possibility of impeachment and the number and duration of presidential terms. Even as fears circulated of a plot to install the son of George III as the king of the United States, the Convention gave a surprising amount of power to the president, perhaps in the expectation that Washington would be the first person to hold the office and could be trusted to exercise those powers prudently.
The Convention adjourned on July 26, leaving a Committee of Detail to organize the existing resolutions into a cohesive whole, although not a final draft. Fierce disagreements remained, but George Washington’s mere presence seemed sufficient to maintain confidence in ultimate success. He visited the old army encampment of Valley Forge, where the Continental Army endured a brutal winter in 1777, a reminder that difficult times had to be endured before achieving great successes.
The Committee of Detail issued its report on August 6, calling for an emphasis on “essential principles” rather than a plethora of details (197). They counseled against the inclusion of a preamble or excessive references to the importance of the Constitution. They proposed getting down to business promptly, with articles dividing the major issues and sections clearly outlining the precise powers and duties of each branch. With the report distributed, the delegates then turned to the question of slavery. Despite widespread disdain for the practice, the southern states would not join the union without some protections for the institution, and so while they agreed to cease the importation of enslaved people by 1808, they secured the notorious “Three-fifths Compromise” whereby 60% of enslaved people would be considered part of the population for the purposes of representation in the House. Even so, some delegates issued strong condemnations of slavery, including George Mason, though he himself was an enslaver. Only Charles Pinckney defended slavery. Rufus King insisted on viewing the issue “in a political light only” (204). The issue was thus closed with respect to the Convention, but of course would come back to haunt the United States again before too long.
As the heat grew even more unbearable, the Convention debated the criteria for allowing non-native citizens to hold federal office. The Senate seemed a particularly dangerous place for foreigners, given the role that the Senate would play in making foreign policy. Madison preferred such matters to be handled by Congress, lest the Constitution read as a xenophobic document. The question was rendered somewhat awkward by the presence of delegates who themselves had not been born in the United States, such as Hamilton and James Wilson, who pointed out the key role of foreign soldiers in the Continental Army. They decided to make foreign-born people eligible for the House and Senate at seven and nine years’ residency, respectively, while prohibiting the presidency entirely.
The next topic was where to place the national capital, which was agreed ought to be in a federal district so as to avoid entanglement with state politics. For an unknown reason, the phrase “ten mile square” caught on (209), and while some worried about a federal district undermining the authority of the neighboring states, or that a federal capital would become a “seat of empire” (210). The Constitution ultimately did not resolve the issue, but was able to delegate the power to Congress to establish a federal district of ten square miles or less.
Even with many of the big questions approaching settlement, the delegates had not quite grasped the significance of what they were about to achieve. With the three branches of government largely in place, they turned to details, such as sumptuary laws, or taxations on luxuries to encourage more modest, republican habits of consumption. They raised the question of loyalty oaths, which some found unsuitable for a free society. There was also the question of a religious litmus test for office, which had been present in some state governments. The two issues ran together, as an oath to support the government often included a religious component to ensure its veracity. Ultimately, the constitution decided not to deal with religion at all, while affirming that all federal officeholders must swear an oath to support the Constitution.
The delegates affirmed Congress’ power to tax and regulate commerce, but controversy arose over the question of raising armies, especially to subdue a rebellion within the states. Opponents found themselves in the minority, but their opposition would prove strong enough to prevent them from signing the Constitution in September. The next task was to define the crime of treason, which a government could use to punish dissent. There were people within the US who had remained loyal to the Crown, and had been targets of discrimination within the states. Following an intense round of debate, with multiple drafts submitted and resubmitted, they defined treason as a crime against the United States (not an individual state) but with the high standard of “levying war against [the states], or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort” (223). In a break from English tradition, they refused to visit the crime of treason on the children of a convicted offender. Some delegates opposed this on the grounds that fighting against the government could be part of a noble tradition, and that forbidding it would lead people to “tamely and passively yield to despotism” (223), but as with the standing army the opponents were relatively few.
By mid-August, the delegates recognized that they were nearing the end, at least of their patience. State legislatures were preparing to convene, including in Pennsylvania, and they wanted the Constitution to be up for ratification. With some states practically certain to reject the Constitution, the main question became the threshold of ratification—revising the Articles would require unanimity, but an entirely new system might be able to pass with a majority of states, which would then put immense pressure on the holdouts. Drawing upon a tradition of “recourse to a higher law, a law above kings, princes and parliaments” when faced with a great political difficulty (227), delegates framed this seemingly undemocratic (even illegal) measure as a basic question of political order. They agreed that the ratification of nine states would be sufficient to establish a new government.
The next major question concerned the proper source of ratification—state legislatures or the voters. Madison argued that the state legislatures were far too self-interested to take part, while others raised concerns about the plausibility of a direct vote and the problem of circumventing the state authorities. Arguments went on for a long time, as the source of ratification would ultimately confirm the constitution as a revision of the Articles or a new government, and opponents of either position were not ready to concede. The issue would not be settled by floor debate, and the delegates adjourned.
The Connecticut Compromise marks the climax of both Idealism and the Need for Compromise and State Versus Federal Power. All the delegates, with the possible exception of Hamilton and Morris, saw Congress as the first and most important of the branches of government, the one closest to the people and charged with the paramount of task of lawmaking. Accordingly, the scheme of representation within the houses of Congress had to most clearly represent the basic ideological framework behind the government itself. Under Sherman’s compromise, nobody really had to give up on their vision, they just had to allow the other vision to coexist with theirs. Proportional representation in the House meant that the most democratic body would consider the states as parts of a broader union, that the Americans truly would be one people. Equal representation of states in the Senate meant that the more august and deliberative of the two legislative bodies—the one given a special role in managing American’s Relationship to the Outside World—would allow the states to play a much more central role. After struggling for months to compromise, the delegates managed to create a scheme that upheld both ideals, the state and the nation. This was importantly not only because the debate had taken up so much time, but also because it was the main point of contention and posed the greatest threat to the Convention’s success as a whole. The small states, who regarded themselves as underdogs, saw their triumph in the upper house as a David and Goliath story, and wrote jubilant letters home that “the Convention goes on well and there is hope of great good to result from their counsels” (187)—a welcome shift in tone from the gloomier letters Bowen cites earlier. From that point forward, there was no real risk of the Convention falling apart, and the delegates would be more and more able to delegate the work of drafting the actual text to committees. The resolution of this great debate largely ended the need for further debates.
As significant as the Connecticut Compromise was, the succeeding chapters reveal the limitations of Idealism and the Need for Compromise. Bowen is understandably complimentary of the delegates’ overall willingness to work together for the greater good, but there can be little celebration of the infamous Three-fifths Compromise, which was no less shameful for its political necessity. The interest of enslavers, then and later, tended to overlap with that of Anti-Federalists, as they (rightly) feared federal power could be used to stamp out a state’s right to slavery. The nationalists could thus consider it a kind of victory that now “Congress could control traffic in slaves exactly as it controlled all other trade and commerce” (201). Later nationalists would try to use this power to stop the spread of slavery, ultimately precipitating the Civil War. It is not clear if there was any path forward to a Constitution without slavery, but regardless, the Three-fifths Compromise stands out as an example of compromise that severely undermined the idealism at the heart of the project. In the subsequent debates over a federal capital, definitions of treason, a standing army, and modes of ratification, compromise was less necessary because majorities were easier to form. Delegates such as Gerry and Martin were still fighting a hard battle against what they saw as overweening federal power, but for many of their erstwhile allies, their claims were becoming increasingly moot. Martin and Gerry were surely hoping that the unanimous consent of all states would be necessary for ratification of the Constitution, but it soon became clear that the same majority forming around the basic shape of the document was the same majority that could ordain its ratification. Gerry and Martin, once the most strident voices on one side of the State Versus Federal Power debate, soon found themselves all but alone.
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